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Statement of Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 78A-3-102(3)O) to review the
district court's decision and order granting Defendant-Appellee UDOT's motion for
summary judgment, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56.

Issues Presented for Review

I.

Did UDOT' s act of issuing a construction permit proximately cause

Plaintiffs' accident and injuries, thereby reinstating UDOT' s immunity from suit under
the permit exception? The district court ruled that since Plaintiffs' injuries "arose out of'
the permit, that UDOT retained immunity. The district court did not rule on the issue of
proximate cause, because the issue only became relevant after Barneck v. Utah DOT,
2015 UT 50; 353 P.3d 140, which was handed down shortly after the district court's
ruling.
(jjp

2.

Can UDOT' s negligent actions be characterized as formal, official acts,

thereby reinstating UDOT's immunity from suit under the permit exception? The district
court ruled that UDOT's issuance of the construction permit was a formal official
vi)

authorization. The court also ruled that UDOT' s subsequent negligent act of failing to
ensure that the traffic control plan was being carried out correctly was also covered by the
permit exception.

Standard of Review
In Barneck v. Utah DOT, 2015 UT 50; 353 P.3d 140, which also involved the
review of a district court order deciding a summary judgment motion concerning
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governmental immunity, the Court explained: "we review the district court's decision
granting summary judgment de novo, affording it no deference. In so doing, we determine
whether UDOT has established that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it
is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. /d. at 143.
Preservation of the Issues

The issues raised in the Brief for Appellants, and this brief, were preserved by the
Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to UDOT' s motion for summary judgment and
supporting exhibits. R. 1055-1126, except for the issue of proximate cause, as explained
in "Issues Presented", supra.

Determinative Statutes

Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-301(2)(h)(i) and (i) state that "Immunity from suit of each
governmental entity is waived: except as provided in Subsection 630-7-201 (3), as to any
injury caused by: a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway ..... and (i)
subject to Subsection 630-7-201 (4). as to any injury proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment.
Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-201 (4 )(c)(d) state that "a governmental entity, its officers,
and its employees are immune from suit, and immunity is not waived, for any injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment, if the injury arises our of or in connection with, or results from: (c)
the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or the failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization" and (d) a failure to make an inspection or making inadequate inspection or
negligent inspection.

2
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Statement of the Case
This case involves a motor vehicle negligent matter in which Plaintiffs were
injured after their motorcycle was struck by former Defendant Kristi Oleson on a state~

controlled roadway in Odgen, Utah. R. 1156. A construction project was underway in the
area where the collision occurred. R. 1156. Defendant UDOT issued a construction
permit to former Defendant Associated Brigham Contractors (ABC). R. 1157. ABC
drafted a traffic control plan, which UDOT approved. R. 1157. Plaintiffs claim pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-301(2)(h)(i) and (i) that UDOT was negligent by failing to
maintain a safe highway; in particular, by failing to approve a safe traffic control plan
and failing to monitor traffic to ensure the plan was being complied with. R. 1157.
UDOT brought a motion for summary judgment, claiming the permit exception of
Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-301(4) (now 63G-7-201(4)(c) applied, which thereby retained
immunity. R. 1007-1054. Judge Joseph M. Bean agreed, and granted UDOT summary
judgment. R. 1155-1162. It is from this decision that Plaintiffs appeal.
Defendants Kristi Oleson (Crosbie), and Associated Brigham Contractors (ABC)
have been dismissed from the case. The only remaining defendant is UDOT.

Statement of Facts
On June 19, 2009, Plaintiff Thomas True was riding his motorcycle southbound
on Midland Drive, with his wife Plaintiff Melissa True riding as a passenger, at the

3
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intersection with 1900 West, in Odgen, Utah. R. 1156. 1900 West is a state highway (SR126). R. 1156. As Plaintiffs were proceeding through the intersection, they were struck by
a truck driven by former Defendant Kristi Oleson, who was turning left from Midland
Drive to 1900 West. R. 1156. As a result of the collision, Plaintiffs suffered injuries. R.
156.
At the time of the collision, a construction project (hereinafter "project") was
underway to install a water main line for Odgen City that went beneath the intersection.
R. 1156. Former Defendant ABC was the general contractor on the project. R. 1156.
Because the project involved digging or excavating within the right-of-way of a state
highway, ABC was required by law to obtain a permit before commencing construction.
R. 1156. As part of the permit process, ABC was required to submit a traffic control plan,
which Defendant UDOT approved. R. 1157. Then UDOT issued ABC a permit for the
construction. R. 1157. The permit granted ABC permission to encroach on the state
highway for purposes of the project. R. 1157. Pursuant to UDOT's Standard Specification
regarding Traffic Control on the project, a UDOT inspector was required to be assigned
to the project with the primary responsibility of verifying contractor compliance with the
Traffic Control Plan. R. 1057, 1065-1071. UDOT transportation technician John Bangle
was assigned by UDOT to make inspections of the project. R. 1157. He regularly
inspected the job site and supported ABC in its efforts to implement and comply with the

4
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traffic control plan. R. 1157. Ogden City Right of Way Construction inspector Lynn
Peterson testified at his deposition that UDOT had the ultimate authority over traffic
control where the collision occurred. R. 1058, 1084-1085.
Plaintiffs claim that UDOT was negligent by approving an unsafe traffic control
plan, by failing to maintain a safe intersection, and by failing to properly monitor the
traffic control plan to ensure it was being carried out in accordance with the plan. R.
1157. In particular, UDOT failed in its duty by allowing the removal of a no-left-tum sign
days before the collision took place, contrary to the traffic control plan, which would have
@

prevented former Defendant Oleson from turning left into the path of the Plaintiffs on the
day of the collision. R. 1058, 1101-1106.
Defendant UDOT claims that it is immune from suit pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
63G-7-201(4)(c), which retains immunity when an "injury arises out of, in connection
with, or results from: ... (c) the issuance [of] ... any permit, license, certificate, approval,
order, or similar authorization; and (d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection." R. 1007-1021.

Summary of Argument
This Court should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to UDOT
for two reasons.

5
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First, the district court used a "but for" test to determine that since the traffic
control plan was part of the construction permit, the permit exception applied; that
Plaintiffs' injuries would not have occurred but for the issuance of the construction
permit. However, since then, the Court in Barneck rejected the "but for" test and instead
ruled that for the permit exception to apply, the immunity invoking condition (issuing the
permit) must be a proximate cause of a plaintiffs injuries. In this case, Plaintiffs' injuries
were not proximately caused by UDOT issuing the construction permit. Plaintiffs' injuries
were caused by UDOT's own negligence in approving an unsafe traffic control plan and
then failing to make sure the plan was being carried out correctly.

Secondly, the permit exception reinstating immunity does not apply because
UDOT's negligent action of allowing others at the site to remove the no-left-tum sign
cannot be characterized as a formal, official act, triggering the exception.
Argument
I.

The permit exception reinstating immunity does not apply to this case
because UDOT's issuance of the construction permit did not
proximately cause Plaintiffs' accident and injuries.

In its motion for summary judgment, UDOT argued, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
63G-7-101, et seq., that UDOT is immune from suit under the Government Immunity
Act. R. 1007-1021. The Utah Supreme Court requires that courts follow three steps when
analyzing the application of the Act. Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54, 122 P.3d 599. The

6
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first step is whether the action involved is a government function, and the second step is
to determine whether the government has waived immunity under the act. UDOT
concedes that the first two steps are met in this case.
The third step is to determine whether an exception applies that provides immunity
in this case. For purposes of the summary judgment motion only, UDOT concedes
Plaintiffs' injuries were "proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of employment," for which immunity is generally
waived. Utah Code Ann. 630-7-301(4). R. 1012, 1158. UDOT claims it is immune from
Plaintiffs' suit because UDOT issued a permit to ABC for the construction project (the
"permit exception"). R. 1007-1021. The permit exception provides that "if the injury
arises out of, in connection with, or results from ... the issuance, denial, suspension, or
revocation of, or by failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit,
license ... " then the government is immune under the act. Utah Code Ann. 630-7201(4)( c).
Judge Michael Lyon, the first presiding judge, previously recognized in this case
that UDOT owes Plaintiffs a duty to maintain its roads in a safe condition, and that the
permit exception does not apply. R. 0062-0065. In July 2011, UDOT filed a motion to
dismiss this case, claiming that UDOT was immune because Plaintiffs' injuries arose out
of UDOT's issuance of a construction permit to ABC. R. 0027-0033. Plaintiffs argued

7
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that their claim for negligence arose not from issuance of the permit, but from UDOT' s
own negligence in failing to ensure that the intersection was safe during construction. R.
0045-0050. Judge Lyon denied UDOT's Motion to Dismiss, ruling that
the Complaint in this case claims that UDOT was negligent for failing to
maintain safe traffic environment at an intersection. Such allegations are
not based on the issuance of a permit by UDOT, but rather UDOT's failure
to maintain a safe roadway. Consequentially, this is not a situation where the
permit exception applies. Additionally, if UDOT' s interpretation was adopted
by this Court it would effectively allow UDOT nearly limitless immunity
despite the Legislature's clear intent to waive governmental immunity for
injury caused by failure to maintain its road. R. 1064.
Judge Joseph M. Bean, however, granted UDOT' s motion for summary judgment,
ruling that "the permit exception identified in 63G-7-301(5)(c) (now Utah Code Ann.
63G-7-201(4)(c)) applies to UDOT's issuance of the permit to ABC." R. 1159. "UDOT's
approval of an unsafe traffic control plan is definitely related to and arises out of the
issuance of the Permit". R. 1160. "UDOT's failure to properly monitor traffic control to
ensure it was being carried out in accordance with the traffic control plan is clearly
covered by 63G-7-301(f)(d) as a 'failure to make inspection or by making an inadequate
or negligent inspection."' R. 1160. "It is also covered by the permit exception." R. 1160.
Basically, Judge Bean followed the "but-for" causation test and determined that
Plaintiffs' injuries would not have occurred but for the issuance of the construction
permit.
Soon after Judge Bean issued his ruling, the Utah Supreme Court, in Barneck v.
8
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~

Utah DOT, 2015 UT 50; 353 P.3d 140, rejected the "but for" causation test used in prior
cases and now holds that the exception provisions (such as the permit exception at issue
in this case) reinstating immunity are properly invoked only where a plaintiffs injury is
~

proximately caused by the government conduct. Id. at 149.
In Barneck, a culvert in Duchesne County became obstructed after a rainstorm,
causing water to back up onto a roadway. The water eventually caused the roadway to
collapse, leaving a chasm. The plaintiffs unknowingly drove into the chasm and were
either killed or injured. Barneck at 142.
The Court was asked to interpret and apply competing provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act. Plaintiffs argued that immunity was waived "for any injury
caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway [or] ... culvert",
pursuant to 63G-7-301(3)(a)(i), while UDOT claimed immunity was reinstated because
the "injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from ... the management of flood
waters" or "repair of [a] flood or storm system" pursuant to 63G-7-301(5)(p)(q). Barneck
at 142.
In Barne ck, UDOT argued that "immunity attaches if there is any causal
connection between the management of flood waters or the operation of a storm system
and the plaintiffs' injuries." Barneck at 149. The Court however, concluded that this "but
for" test was too broad and held that UDOT' s approach ''yields an expansive notion of the

9
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Immunity Act's exceptions that effectively swallows the antecedent waivers." Id. The
Court determined a new causation standard: "an immunity-invoking condition (such as
management of flood waters ... ) must be a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries in
order to sustain the reinstatement of immunity." Id.
The Court went on to discuss proximate cause, stating that "in order to determine
whether a defendant's conduct is the proximate cause of an injury, it is ... necessary to
~

determine whether the harm caused is within the scope of the risk created by the
defendant's conduct." Barneck at 152, footnote 20. In other words, a plaintiffs injuries
must be the foreseeable result of the government's immunity-invoking conduct (such as
managing flood waters in Barneck, or issuing a construction permit in this case).
In this case, Plaintiffs' injuries were not proximately caused by UDOT issuing the
construction permit (the immunity-invoking condition), which incidentally included a
traffic control plan. Plaintiffs contend that their injuries were caused by UDOT
negligently approving an unsafe traffic control plan and then subsequently failing to make
sure the plan was being carried out when others removed the no-left-tum sign days before
the collision occurred. Issuing the construction permit did not foreseeably heighten the
"scope of the risk" of Plaintiffs' accident. Barneck at 153, discussing Hoyer, 2009 UT 38;
212 P.3d 547. Hundreds, if not thousands of motorists drove through the intersection
during construction without incident. See Addendum, deposition testimony of UDOT

10
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inspector John Bangle, page 90, lines 12-17. This is the type of case the Barneck Court

had in mind when it stated that
Most important is the fact that a but-for" reading of "arises out of' would
allow the statutory exceptions to nullify the immunity waivers in a number of
common circumstances. It is easy to imagine circumstances in which the
government's waiver of immunity for negligence would be completely erased
by a but-for connection to wide-ranging activity covered by an exception-like the
performance of a 'discretionary function', Utah Code 63G-7-301 (5)(a), 'the
collection of and assessment of taxes", id. 63G-7-301 (5)(h), or the 'issuance,
denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny,
suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization, id. 63G-7-301 (5)(c). If a but-for connection to these activities were
enough to override the government's waiver of immunity for negligence, the
statutory waiver would be overridden in a wide range of cases. That makes little
sense in the context of a statute aimed at waiving governmental immunity for
negligence ... specified in the waiver provisions.

Barneck at 150-151.

UDOT should not be allowed to issue a construction permit to a third party and
'<:I

then hide behind the permit exception when they were negligent in their own right by
allowing others at the site to remove the no-left-tum sign. As the Court in Thayer v.

~

Washington County School District, 2012 UT 31; 285 P.3d 1142 held:

a governmental entity may not issue approvals or authorizations to itself or its
employees to immunize negligent conduct under the Governmental Immunity
Act. .. Governmental employees' actions are frequently, if not always, approved
or authorized by their employers in some fashion. Were we to interpret the
Licensing Exception to include such routine operational approvals, the waiver
of immunity in employee negligence cases would be rendered useless because
11
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governmental entities would all have the ability to circumvent the provision.
The Licensing Exception would "swallow' the waiver rule." Id. at 1149.

Argument

II.

The permit exception reinstating immunity does not apply to this case because
UDOT's negligent actions cannot be characterized as formal, official acts.
In addition, the permit exception does not apply in this case because UDOT's
~

negligent actions cannot be characterized as formal, official acts. In Winkler v. Lemieux,
State of Utah, and UDOT, 2014 UT App 141; 329 P.3d 849, the plaintiff was injured in a

vehicular collision that occurred after a UDOT highway flagger negligently allowed two
cars traveling in opposite directions to use the same lane through a construction zone. Id.
at 850. UDOT moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it was exempt from liability under
the "licensing exception" Id. (the same permit exception UDOT is claiming in this case).
Although the Court of Appeals' decision did not discuss the specifics of the license or
permit at issue, it concluded that the licensing exception did not apply because the
flagger's actions could not be properly characterized as formal, official acts. Id. at 852.
The Court in Winkler relied on Thayer v Washington County School District, 2012
UT 31 ; 28 5 P .3 d 1143. In Thayer, a boy gained access to a gun that was being used in a
school play and shot himself. Id. at 1144. The school's drama teacher sought approval for
use of the gun from the school district's resource officer, who approved the use of the gun

12
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under certain conditions. Id. The resource officer also consulted with the school's vice
principal, who agreed with the officer's approval. Id.
The Thayer Court set forth two elements that must be satisfied for the licensing
exception to apply and the State to retain immunity- authority and formality.Id. at 1147.
The state agency must have the regulatory authority to issue the license, permit, etc., and
the action must be a formal official act. Id. The Court ruled that the permit exception did
not apply because the school district's authorization of the gun ''was not a formal, official
authorization by a government body or employee endowed with regulatory power to issue
C&J

such an authorization." Id. at 1148.
The Court in Winkler concluded that while UDOT had the authority under the test
outlined in Thayer to close or restrict travel on its highways, the highway flagger' s
actions lacked the formality necessary to allow UDOT to invoke the licensing exception.
Winkler at 851-852. As the Court noted, "the record before us is insufficient to support a

vi

legal conclusion that the flagger's signal possessed even the level of formality that Thayer
found insufficient." Id. at 852. Since the permit exception did not apply, UDOT did not
<@

retain immunity.
In this case, Plaintiffs concede that UDOT had the statutory authority to approve
the traffic control plan, monitor traffic control, restrict access to roads at the construction
site, and supervise others at the site. However, like UDOT' s actions in Winkler, UDOT' s

13
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decisions in this case regarding traffic safety at the construction site cannot be
characterized as formal, official authorizations. Just as there were no "institutional
procedure that might have imparted formality to the flagger's decision to allow traffic to
proceed in Winkler, there was no formal official action taken in this case when UDOT
failed to maintain the intersection in a safe condition and failed to adequately supervise
others at the scene by allowing the removal of the no-left-tum sign. Since UDOT's
actions or inactions cannot be characterized as formal and official, the permit exception
does not apply, and UDOT does not have immunity.
Conclusion

UDOT does not have immunity under the permit exception because Plaintiffs'
injuries were not proximately caused by the issuance of the permit. In addition, the permit
exception does not apply because UDOT's negligence in allowing the no-left-tum sign to
be removed did not amount to an official, formal act.
Dated this 16th day of December, 2016

Francis J. Martin
LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD M. LESTER
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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Certificate of Compliance with Rule 24(f)(l)
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(l)
because this brief contains 3,616 Words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by
Utah R. App. 24(t)(l)(B).
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(b)
@

because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using
WordPerfect in size 13 Times New Roman font.
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ADDENDUM
EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF
UDOT INSPECTOR JOHN BANGLE
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COMPRESSED
CERTIFIED.TRANSC RIPT

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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Thomas K. True v.
Kristi Oleson

John Bangle
January 16, 2013
Page 12

Page 10

(10:29:36-10:30:57)

-- to do work in maintenance or in the permits,
looking at inspecting the traffic control.
3
Q. Like inspecting a traffic control plan?
4
A. Yes.
5
Q. So is part of your duties to make sure
6 that a traffic control plan is being carried out
7 according to plan?
8
A. Correct. Yes.
9
Q. Okay. Do you yourself, have you ever
10 come up with or designed a traffic control plan?
A. Mock ones in training.
11
12
Q. Who would do that in your office then?
13 Would it be an engineer?
14
A. Yes.
15
Q. But you yourself have .never designed one?
16
A. No.
17
Q. Who was over in the -- at UDOT is there a
18 traffic engineering department?
19
A. Yes. I worked for Tommy Vigil, and his
20 boss was our traffic engineer.
21
Q. Okay. Who's the current traffic engineer
22 over there? I think it was mentioned earlier, but -23
A. Currently I do not know because I am no
24 longer in the permit department, I'm in maintenance
25 and construction.
1

2

{10:33:11-10:34:15)
1 being a flagger_ involve?
2

3

4
5

6
7

8
9

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A. You were trained on how to flag traffic.
Your requirements of a flagger for a tire, your
actions, where you were supposed to sit. You learned
you were supposed to have an escape route, things like
that. How to control traffic as a flagger.
Q. And have you ever controlled traffic as a
flagger?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. What kind of situations were -- would a
flagger be required?
A. A two-Jane road, opposite direction, or
traffic would flow in opposite direction. One side of
the road work needed to be performed so it would take
that down now to a one-lane road which traffic would
need to travel in both directions.
So it would be stopped, flagged on both
sides, and flaggers would be required there.
Q. Have you ever wo1·ked as a flagger out in
the field, so to speak?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. And .do you still do that?
A. If required.
MR. MINER: You don't do it for fun?
THE WITNESS: No. There's -- standing .

Page 11
(10:31:25-10:32:42)

1

Q.

(10:34:25-10:35:23)

Right. Okay.

A. Cun·ent]y, I don't know who it is
3 currently.
4
Q. So what did your -- as far as traffic
5 control, what did your UDOT training consist of?
A. Learning what the devices were, what they
6
7 did, placement.
B
Q. And did it involve classroom instruction?
9
A. Yes, it did. It involved when you
10 struted out with UDOT you actually attended an
11 academy, and at that academy one of the sessions was
12 traffic control training. We do get ce1tified and
13 then we also have to have an additional training and
14 testing, I think every three years.
15
Q. And is there any -- as part of your
16 training is there any, like, on-the-job training as
17 far as actually setting up traffic control?
18
A. Well -19
Q. As part of gettit1g your ce1tificate?
20
A. As part of getting your ce1tificate you
21 don't -- you do not physically go out and set it up in
22 the field. As far as your training in the classroom
23 we would not go out and actually place a device in the
24 road, no, it's classroom activity.
25
Q. And what did your trainings as far as
2

1
2

3
4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

Page 13

next to traffic for fun.
MR. MARTIN: Especially in this weather,
right?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. BY MR. MARTIN: Okay. You said you have
some Hazmat. Any other certificates from UDOT you can

think of besides traffic control, flagger, Hazmat?
A. The CDL, I don't -- that's just a
commercial driver's license, but I don't-- no, I
don't think so.
Q. Okay. So do you recall this construction
project that involved instaUing a water main line at
the corner of 1900 West and Midland Drive in Ogden
back in June 2009?
A. I do remember •Q. Okay.
A. -- the project.
Q. So you were•- it's my understanding you
were actually at the scene at various times at that
intersection while the construction was going on; is
that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Just to get a frame of reference here.
So ifl refer to "the project11 in future
questions, will you understand that I'm referring to
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Page 90

(12:40:14-12:41 :16)
1 testified to being on the comer where you drew
2 your vehic]e. Do you have any independent

3
4

in

recollection of any no left hand turn signs at that
side of the intersection on that -- on that pa1ticular

s day?

(12:42:38-12:43:45)
1
A. No, I do not.
2
MR. MARTIN:

3
4

MR. FORD: Very quickly.

s

I don't remember.
6
MR. JEFFERIES: Okay. That's al1 the
7
e questions I have.
a
9
MR. MARTIN: Just a couple of follow ups. 9
1o
1o
11
RE-EXAMINATION
11
12 BY MR. MARTIN:
12
13
Q. Are you aware of any other accidents,
13
14 motor vehicle accidents that occm1·ed at that
14
1s intersection during the whole entire project?
15
16
A. I don't remember any. I do not remember
16
1 7 any other -- .other accidents in the project.
17
10
Q. And you mentioned earlier,just from
18
19 looking at your log notes -- in 'fact I have it
19
20 right -- the one date that I had in mind was June 4th, 20
21 2009.
21
22
You mentioned on that day you were
22
23 policing up the barrels, and my understanding was you 23
24 were just straightening them, making sure they were 24
2s upright and straightening them; is that right?
2s
6

Okay. Okay. I have nothing

further.

A.

7

RE-EXAMINATION
BY MR. FORD:
Q. Back to Exhibit 20. Do you know of
anyone else from UDOTwho was looking at the traffic
control devices to see whether they conformed with the

traffic control plan, other than yourself?
A. Say it again, please.
Q. Do you know of anybody else from UDOT who
was looking at the traffic control devices to see
whether they complied with the traffic control plan?
MR. MINER: When?
MR. FORD: Throughout the project.
THE WITNESS: I can't recollect anybody
doing -- I can't remember anybody doing that.
Q: BY MR. FORD: As far as you recall you
were the only one from UDOT that was doing that?
A. As far as I know I was.
Q. Okay. So this report from the day of the
accident, this last sentence of the comment paragraph
says:

Page 91
(12:41:31-12:42:31)
1
A. Correct.
2

3
4

s
6

7

a
9

10
11
12
13
14
1s
16
17
10
19
20
21
22
23

24
2s

When I say policing up the
bari·els, it's kind of a general thing. It could be
getting them back in line, standing them up if one was
knocked over.
Q. So other than that day do you remember
doing that at any other time during the project?
A. I do not remember.
MR. MINER: And you didn't do that
yourself, did you?
THE WITNESS: No. That's their
responsibility to take care of that. I don't go and
set traffic control up or con-ect traffic control.
Q. BY MR. MARTIN: So you would have
directed --you brought it to someone's attention?
A. Yes, yeah.
Q. They would have done it?
A. If I read this it states, even, that
policing up ofbam~ls will be taken care of during
work area setup. So they're going to set it up,
they're going to take care of it. So, no, I would not
be out there moving traffic control,. changing lanes,
devices, or anything like that.
Q. Do you remember the specifics of why you
had mentioned the policing of the ban-els on this
pa1ticular day?

Page 93

(12:43:55-12:44:34)
1
"All

traffic control in place at the
time of accident as well as through
entire work day and was placed
according to UDOT's approval.
As far as you know you're the only one

2

3

11

4

s
6

from UDOT that was giving approval about the placement

of the traffic control devices?
MR. MINER: I'll object to that in that
9 it calls for speculation and lack of foundation.
1o
MR. FORD: Again, I'm just asking what
ll you know.
12
Q. Do you know of anybody else that was
13 doing it besides yourself?
14
A. I don't know.
15
MR. FORD: Okay. All right. That's all.
16
MR. MINER: Let me ask--anything else?
17
MR. JEFFERIES: No.
10
MR. MINER: Let me just ask a couple of
19 questions about Exhibit 19.
7

s

20
21

22
23

24
25

EXAMINATION
BY MR. MINER:
Q. On your entries for the various projects
in parenthesis off to the right, usually, there would
be -- there will be a number and then hours. What is
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